Cryptographic Primitives to Prevent Jamming Attacks in Wireless Networks

Abstract

The wireless medium provides varied challenging options among varied set of users because of its sharing nature. The open nature of the wireless medium leaves it susceptible to intentional interference attacks, generally mentioned as jamming. This intentional interference with wireless transmissions are often used as a pad for mounting Denial-of-Service attacks on wireless networks. Typically, jam has been addressed beneath associate external threat model. However, adversaries with internal knowledge of protocol specifications and network secrets will launch low-effort jam attacks that are tough to detect and counter. In this work, we tend to address the matter of jamming attacks in wireless networks. In these attacks, the antagonist is active solely for a short amount of your time, selectively targeting messages of high importance.  The benefits of jamming terms of network performance degradation and opposer effort by presenting selective attack on routing.  We are using AOMDV routing protocol that gives better packet delivery ratio. We show that jamming attacks are often launched by performing real time packet classification at the physical layer. To overcome these attacks, we develop a scheme that stop real time packet classification by combining cryptographical primitives with physical-layer attributes. We analyze and measure the computational and communication overhead.